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RECENT TRENDS
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF SPECTROGRAPHIC VOICE IDENTIFICATION IN
THE STATE COURTS
The admissibility of spectrographic voice iden-
tification evidence has been the subject of great
controversy in the state courts' since its first appel-
late consideration in 1967.2 Early courts rejected
this evidence as failing the Frye test for admissibil-
ity3 since the underlying scientific technique of
spectrographic voice identification had not been
generally accepted as reliable by the scientific com-
munity.4 Later courts which were convinced of the
reliability of the technique modified the Frye test
so that the technique needed only to have been
accepted by its proponents for identification testi-
mony based thereon to be admitted.5 In recent
1 Spectrographic voice identification evidence also
raises several constitutional issues but these have been
resolved without controversy. See, e.g., United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (compulsion of voice exemplar
does not violate privilege against self-incrimination or
constitute an unreasonable seizure).
2 In 1967, spectrographic voice identification was con-
sidered by a military appellate court in United States v.
Wright, 17 C.M.A. 183, 37 C.M.R. 447 (1967), and a
state appellate court in State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343, 230
A.2d 384 (1967).
3 In Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir.
1923), the Court of Appeals for District of Columbia set
forth the "general acceptance" test for the admissibility
of scientific evidence:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses
the line between the experimental and demonstra-
ble stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in the
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle
must be recognized, and while courts will go a long
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the
thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established, to have gained general ac-
ceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
This test of admissibility was articulated in the consid-
eration of the systolic blood pressure deception test but
it has since been broadly applied to newly developed
scientific techniques. See Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374,
-, 391 A.2d 364, 369 (1978).
4 See notes 13-23 & accompanying text infra.
5See notes 31-34 & accompanying text infi'a.
cases, however, several courts have returned to the
traditional Frye test and rejected spectrographic
voice identification evidence upon assessment of
the views of the broader community of speech
scientists.6 Confirming this recent trend in the state
courts, the Court of Appeals of Maryland con-
cluded in Reed v. State7 that the traditional Frye test
best meets institutional concerns for consistent de-
cisions and individual demands for fair prosecu-
tion. The court correctly determined that the va-
lidity of spectrographic voice identification has not
yet been established to the satisfaction of speech
scientists and, until the general acceptance is
achieved, spectrographic voice identification evi-
dence must be held inadmissible.8
In 1941, researchers at Bell Laboratories in-
vented the spectrograph, an electromagnetic in-
strument that generates a spectrogram, a pattern
on paper reflecting the frequency, tine, and inten-
sity of a recorded voice. 9 The spectrograph was
developed as a tool for the study of speech, and it
was not until 1960 that it was employed in attempts
at speaker identification. 0 Lawrence G. Kersta
claimed that his experiments at Bell Laboratories
showed speaker identification from the comparison
6 See notes 41-47 & accompanying text infia.
It is interesting to note that the trend in the federal courts
is to reject the Frye test and admit spectrographic voice
identification evidence. See United States v. Williams,
583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Baller,
519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975);
United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25 (6th Cir.), cert. deniid,
422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
7 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978).8 See notes 53-61 & accompanying text infia.
9 A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL CASES § 12.03, at 567 (2d ed. 1978).
to Id. Operating on the unproved assumption that each
voice is unique, an examiner makes a subjective compar-
ison of spectrograms. No two spectrographic patterns will
be identical, but the examiner may declare a "match" if
he finds sufficient points of similarity between two spec-
trograms.
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of spectrograms to be ninety-nine per cent accu-
rate." Many members of the scientific community
attacked Kersta's conclusions as based on question-
able assumptions and deficient experimental meth-
ods.' 2 This scientific controversy proved to be of
critical importance in subsequent judicial consid-
eration of the admissibility of identification evi-
dence based on the comparison .of spectrograms.
In State v. Cary,'3 the Supreme Court of New
Jersey became the first appellate court to consider
the admissibility of spectrographic voice identifi-
cation evidence when it was called on to review a
pretrial order to submit a voice exemplar for spec-
trographic analysis. The order was remanded for
the trial court to determine whether spectrographic
analysis was sufficiently accurate to produce ad-
missible evidence and thus justify the intrusion of
the test.t4 At a hearing before the trial court, only
Kersta testified for the prosecution as to the accu-
racy of the identification, 15 while the defense pro-
duced two expert witnesses who testified that there
was an insufficient scientific basis for the claim of
reliability and that the technique was
not generally accepted by scientists. 16 Applying
"the time-honored rule of general scientific accept-
ance," 
7 the trial court concluded that spectro-
graphic voice identification had not "attained such
degree of scientific acceptance and reliability as to
be acceptable as evidence."' 8 This conclusion was
affirmed by the state supreme court. 19
'_ Kersta, Voiceprint Identification, 196 NATURE 1253,
1256 (1962). The term "voiceprint" has recently been
rejected in favor of the more neutral term "spectrogram."
As noted in United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463 (4th
Cir. 1975): "The use of the term 'voiceprint,' with its
overtones of 'fingerprint,' gives voice spectrographic iden-
tification an aura of absolute certainty and accuracy
which is neither justified by the facts nor claimed by
experts in the field." Id. at 465 n.l.
'
2 See, e.g., Bolt, Cooper, David, Denes, Pickett & Ste-
vens, Speaker Identification by Speech Spectrograms: A Scientists'
View of its Reliability for Legal Purposes, 47 J. AcoUSTICAL
Soc'Y OF Am. 597 (1970)[hereinafter cited as Bolt].
1349 N.J. 343, 230 A.2d 384 (1967).
14 Id. at 352, 230 A.2d at 388-89.
u Dr. Oscar Tosi, a speech scientist from Michigan
State University, also testified for the state: "He was of
the opinion that the technique has considerable potential
as an aid to law enforcement, but before he would give
a firm scientific opinion he felt that further experimen-
tation and testing was required because of its infancy in
the related scientific fields." State v. Cary, 99 N.J. Super.
323, 329-30, 239 A.2d 680, 683 (1968).
16 d at 330, 239 A.2d at 683.
17 Id. at 332, 239 A.2d at 684. Without citing the case
by name, the court clearly applied the Frye test. See note
3 supra.
1899 N.J. Super. at 333, 239 A.2d at 685.
'9 State v. Cary, 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (1970).
In People v. King,"2 a California appellate court
reviewed a trial court's admission of identification
testimony by Kersta. The trial court had admitted
Kersta's opinion, based on a comparison of spec-
trograms, that the voice of the perpetrator and the
voice of the defendant were one and the same even
though seven defense witnesses "testified that the
method had not reached sufficient scientific cer-
tainty to be reliable as a positive means of identi-
fication in a court of law."'" The appellate court
found the identification technique to be without
support in the scientific community22 and, ex-
pressly applying the Frye test, rejected Kersta's
identification testimony.
2 3
Three years passed before the issue of admissi-
bility of spectrographic voice identification evi-
dence came before another appellate court. In the
interim, Dr. Oscar Tosi of Michigan State Univer-
sity conducted a significant experiment to check
Kersta's claims and to test various forensic
models.24 Tosi confirmed Kersta's claims of one per
cent error in closed trials with contemporary spec-
trograms of clue words spoken in isolation.25 Noting
the Kersta model to be inapplicable to forensic
situations, however, Tosi also tested the effect on
accuracy of identification of several variables
which arise in forensic situations.2 Finding a range
of error from .9% to 29. 1%,27 Tosi hypothesized
20 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1968).
21 Id at 442, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 481. The tape of the voice
of the perpetrator was obtained from a CBS documentary
in which an unidentified man admitted committing arson
during the Watts riots. The tape of the voice of the
defendant was obtained by bugging thejail cell in which
he was interrogated. The spectrograms developed from
these tapes were compared by Kersta and provided the
basis for his identification testimony.
22 The court also noted that, as an engineer, Kersta
was not a member of the community of speech scientists
and was therefore unqualified to give scientific opinions
in the area of speech identification. Id. at 457-59, 72 Cal.
Rptr. at 491-92.
2 Id. at 460-61, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
24 Tosi, Oyer, Lashbrook, Pedrey, Nicol & Nash, Ex-
periment on Voice Identification, 51 J. AcoUSTICAL Soc'Y OF
AM. 2030 (1972)[hereinafter cited as Tosi]. Kersta had
conducted closed trials where there was a "known" spec-
trogram to match each "unknown" spectrogram in the
comparison set. Each spectrogram depicted the utterance
of the same ten words, with the words spoken in isolation
rather than in context.
25Id. at 2041.26 The variables tested were (1) number of clue words;
(2) number of utterances; (3) types of recording condi-
tions; (4) context of the clue words; (5) number of
"known" speakers; (6) intraspeaker variation; and (7)
awareness of the examiners. Id. at 2033.




that under actual forensic conditions the rate of
error would be significantly lower.2 The Tosi study
was to become the most influential factor in chang-
ing the judicial attitude from scorn to endorsement
of spectrographic voice identification.
In the five years after the release of the Tosi
study in 1971, Tosi and his technical assistant,
Ernest Nash of the Michigan State Police, testified
throughout the country on the subject of spectro-
graphic voice identification. Ordinarily, Tosi tes-
tified to the reliability of the technique and Nash
testified to its application in the particular case. In
seven of eight cases to reach state appellate courts
during this period, the testimony of Tosi and Nash
was accepted.29 In only two of those seven cases did
the defense present expert testimony refuting the
reliability of the techniquea° and in no case did the
defense present contrary expert testimony concern-
ing the particular identification. Except in one case
where the court called additional experts,31 the
courts made no note of the one-sided presentation
of evidence. Indeed, the courts were so taken with
the qualifications of Tosi and Nash that the stan-
dard of admissibility was tailored to accommodate
their testimony.
In order to admit identification testimony based
on the comparison of voice spectrograms, the state
courts found it necessary to avoid the strictures of
the traditional Frye test. In dicta, the first appellate
court to consider spectrographic voice identifica-
tion after the release of the Tosi study suggested
that the opinion of a qualified expert should be
admitted to assist the fact-finder, with the contrary
28 Tosi, supra note 24, at 2041-42. No proofwas offered
to support the assertion that forensic conditions tend to
decrease identification errors. Others contend that im-
portant unexamined factors may increase rather than
decrease the error rate in forensic applications. Siegel,
Cross-Examination of a "Voiceprint" Expert: A Blueprint for
Trial Lautyers, 12 CGUM. L. BULL. 509, 521 (1976).
2 See Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 327
N.E.2d 671 (1975); Commonwealth v. Vitello, 367 Mass.
224, 327 N.E.2d 819 (1975); State ex rel. Trimble v.
Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971); State
v. Andretta, 61 N.J. 544, 296 A.2d 644 (1972); Hodo v.
Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 778, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547
(1973); Alea v. State, 265 So. 2d 96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1972); Worley v. State, 263 So. 2d 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1972). But see People v. Law, 40 Cal. App. 3d 69,
114 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1974). It is significant to note that
the spectrographic voice identification evidence was re-
jected in Law because mimicked voices were involved and
that variable had not been considered in the Tosi study.
30See Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 327
N.E.2d 671 (1975); State ex tel. Trimble v. Hedman, 291
Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971).
31 See State v. Andretta, 61 NJ. 544, 296 A.2d i4.
(1972).
testimony of others going only to weight and cred-
ibility.3 This approach was subsequently adopted
by those federal courts which admitted spectro-
graphic voice identification evidence.as The state
courts, however, fell short of rejecting the Frye test
altogether. Rather, they modified the standard so
that spectrographic voice identification could meet
its requirements.3 The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts expressed this reformulation in Com-
monwealth v. Lykus:35 "Limited in number though
the experts may be, the requirement of the Frye
rule of general acceptability is satisfied,, in our
opinion, if the principle is generally accepted by
those who would be expected to be familiar with
its use."' M6 This definition of the relevant scientific
community required the technique to be accepted
only by those who specifically employed the spec-
trograph to identify speakers, i.e., Tosi, Nash, and
other proponents of the technique.
But this bootstrapping technique was not to
continue indefinitely. In People v. Kelly, 7 the fact
that Nash had been the sole witness to testify to
the reliability of spectrographic examination as
well as to the identity of the speakers prompted the
Supreme Court of California to question whether
a single witness could ever sufficiently represent or
attest to the views of an entire community regard-
ing the reliability of a new technique ass Further-
more, the court noted that Nash, like Kersta before
him, had built his career on the reliability of the
technique and "may be too closely identified with
the endorsements of voiceprint analysis to assess
fairly and impartially the nature and extent of any
opposing scientific views."s The court maintained
a modified Frye standard, but determined that its
requirements had not been met by the testimony
of a technician rather than a scientist."°
Nash had also been the sole witness in Common-
' State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. at 456,
192 N.W.2d at 440. The recommendation of admissibility
was dictum as this case involved a habeas corpus petition
and required only a finding of probable cause to issue
arrest and search warrants.
33 See United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975); United States v. Franks,
511 F.2d 25 (6th Cir. 1975). See also McCoaMtCi's HAND-
NOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 203 (2d ed. 1972).
3' See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. at 203,
327 N.E.2d at 677; Hodo v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App.
3d at 788, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
3'367 Mass. 191, 327 N.E.2d 671 (1975).
36 Id. at 203, 327 N.E.2d at 677.
3' 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144
(1976).
38 Id. at 37, 549 P.2d at 1248, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
39/ . at 38, 549 P.2d at 1249, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
40 Id. t 40, 549 P.2d at 1250, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
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wealth v. Topa," where the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania clearly reasserted the propriety of strict
application of the Frye test when determining the
admissibility of spectrographic voice identification
evidence at criminal trials. The court emphasized
that the "la]dmissibility of the evidence depends
upon the general acceptance of its validity by those
scientists active in the field to which the evidence
belongs., 42 As the testimony of one witness did not
satisfy this standard, the court reviewed cases and
commentaries to conclude that "the reliability of
the sound spectrograph and voiceprint identifica-
tion has not, as yet, been generally accepted by the
scientific community concerned with acoustical sci-
ence."
43
Both Tosi and Nash had testified for the prose-
cution in People v. Tobey, where the Supreme Court
of Michigan reaffirmed its adherence to the Frye
standard. Despite the testimony of both the scien-
tist and the technician, the admission of spectro-
graphic voice identification evidence at trial was
held to be error because the requisite scientific
recognition had not been established by "disinter-
ested and impartial experts.'
'3
With the state supreme court decisions in Kelly,
Topa, and Tobey, it was clear that the Frye standard
was to be strictly applied when interested witnesses
present a one-sided view of scientific acceptance.
The question remained, however, whether the
more exacting standard was appropriate when the
opposing views were well represented at trial. In
Reed v. State,4s the Court of Appeals of Maryland
answered this question in the affirmative.
4 7
In Reed, the trial court had employed a modified
Frye test48 and, after having heard the testimony of
4'471 Pa. 223, 369 A.2d 1277 (1977).
421d at 231, 369 A.2d at 1281.
43id at 232, 369 A.2d at 1282. In particular the court
noted the disapproval expressed by speech scientists in
Bolt, note 12, supra and in Bolt, Cooper, David, Denes,
Pickett & Stevens, Speaker Identification by Speech Spectro-
.grams: Some Further Observations, 54 J. AcousTICAL Soc'v
oF AM. 531 (1973)[hereinafter cited as Bolt].
44401 Mich. 141, 257 N.W.2d 537 (1977).
45Id at 145-46, 257 N.W.2d at 539.
4"391 A.2d 364 (Md. 1978).
47 Four of the seven judges found the application of the
Frye test appropriate in this case, but three judges joined
in a vigorous and lengthy dissent.
48 The trial court construed the Frye test to require
general acceptance ... within the group actually
engaged in the use of this technique and in the
experimentation with this technique.... [Wje are
restricting the relevant field of experts to those who
are knowledgeable, direcly knowledgeable through
work, utilization of the techniques, experimentation
and so forth, that we are not taking the broad
opponents and proponents of the technique," ad-
mitted identification testimony based on the com-
parison of spectrograms. The intermediate appel-
late court found no error in the admission, being
of the opinion that spectrographic voice identifi-
cation had gained enough general acceptance to
satisfy the traditional Frye test.5° Furthermore, the
appellate court, echoing the theory of McCormick
and the federal courts,5 expressed the view that
"it is better to permit the introduction of relevant
scientific evidence and allow the fact finder to
assess its weight after cross examination and refu-
tation."52 The Court of Appeals of Maryland re-
jected the views of the lower courts, holding that
the traditional Frye test was to be strictly applied
and that spectrographic voice identification did
not yet meet the test.5
The Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted the
traditional "general acceptance" test as a legal
standard to govern the trial judge's threshhold
determination as to the admissibility of testimony
based on a new scientific technique. The court was
not content to leave the question of the reliability
of the underlying technique to the discretion of
each trial judge. As the answer to the question of
the reliability of the underlying technique would
not vary according to the circumstances of each
case, the court considered it inappropriate to view
this question as a matter within the discretion of
each trial judge.5M To foster uniformity and con-
sistency of decisionmaking, the court saw the need
for an articulated legal standard by which the
reliability of a scientific technique could be estab-
lished.s The traditional Frye standard of general
acceptance in the relevant scientific community"'
was adopted to fill this need.
general scientific community of speech and hearing
science. In that broad community there probably is
not acceptance.
Reed v. State, 283 Md. at __, 391 A.2d at 377 (quoting
the trial court in Reed).
"9 Dr. Oscar Tosi, Dr. Peter Jansen, Dr. John Mc-
Clung, and Sgt. Lonnie Smrkovski testified for the pros-
ecution. Dr. Donald Baker and Dr. Henry Hollien testi-
fied for the defendant. Reed v. State, 35 Md. App. 472,
372 A.2d 243 (1977).
50 Rather than relying on the testimony or writings of
scientists, the court looked to cases in which spectro-
graphic analysis evidence had been sanctioned in order
to conclude that the Frye test had been met. Id. at 483,
372 A.2d at 251.
51 See notes 32 & 33 & accompanying text supra.
52 35 Md. App. at 483, 372 A.2d at 251.
3 283 Md. at -, 391 A.2d at 377.
54 Id. at, 391 A.2d at 367.
m Id. at ,391 A.2d at 368.
5 See note 68 & accompanying text infra.
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Aware of criticism of the Frye test as inordinately
restrictive of relevant scientific evidence, the Reed
court compared the test to McCormick's proposal
that disagreement in the scientific community re-
garding the reliability of a scientific technique
should go to the weight rather than the admissi-
bility of opinion testimony based on the tech-
nique.57 The court rejected this view as failing to
recognize that disputes as to scientific validity
should not be resolved by laymen on a case by case
basis.
When the positions of the contending factions are
fixed in the scientific community, it is evident that
controversies will be resolved only by further scien-
tific analysis, studies and experiments. Juries and
judges, however, canno experiment. If a judge or
jurors have no foundation, either in their experience
or in the accepted principles of scientists, on which
they might base an informed judgment, they will
be left to follow their fancy.u
Preferring all defendants to face the same bur-
dens, the court considered the inconsistency which
would result from leaving the determination of
scientific validity to the fact-finder to be intolera-
ble.59 Application of the Frye test tends to equalize
the burden since "the results of controversial tech-
niques will not be admitted as long as the scientific
community remains significantly divided."' In ad-
dition to meeting institutional concerns with con-
sistent treatment among defendants, the Fye test
meets the demands of the individual defendant
that the validity of a scientific technique should be
determined by the most qualified assessors before
it is used against him in a criminal trial.6"
Having established the applicability of the Frye
standard, the Reed court reviewed scientific publi-
cations, cases and commentaries in addition to
reviewing the expert testimony in the record to
determine whether spectrographic voice identifi-
cation had achieved general acceptance in the
scientific community since the Tosi study. The
court concluded that the kind and degree of diver-
gence of opinion concerning the reliability of spec-
s7 This view is held by several federal courts. See notes
32 & 33 & accompanying text supra. Since the Federal
Rules of Evidence adopted the McCormick position and
repealed Frye, 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 90 (1978), some state courts
which have adopted the federal rules have also taken this
view. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978).
"8 283 Md. at -, 391 A.2d at 371 (footnote omitted).
59Id.
6 Id.
"' Id. at -, 391 A.2d at 369-70.
trographic voice identification indicated that it
had not been generally accepted in the scientific
community.'
The decision of the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land in Reed confirmed the recent trend in the state
courts to reject spectrographic voice identification
evidence. Rather than indicating a new direction
in the treatment of this scientific evidence, how-
ever, the decision reflects a thoughtful reassessment
of the views of the post-Tosi scientific community0
and illustrates a return to the cautious standard of
admissibility employed in earlier cases. 64 It is
proper to employ the more exacting general ac-
ceptance test in criminal cases where the evidence
based on the questionable scientific technique is
offered to establish the ultimate issue of the case:
the identity of the perpetrator.65 The Frye standard
has been criticized as unduly restricting the court-
room use of new scientific techniques, but this
argument "assumes that the technique will prove
scientifically valid and suggests that postponement
of admission of voiceprint evidence may be harm-
ful to the judicial process."6 Clearly more harm
will come to the judicial process, not to mention
the individual defendant, if the technique proves
unreliable after a hurried admission by the courts.
In fairness to the defendant and in light of the
inability of judge or jury to reach an informed
decision, the determination of the validity and
reliability of spectrographic voice identification is
properly left to the relevant scientific community.
67
And the relevant scientific community for purposes
of determining the validity of spectrographic voice
identification includes "those whose scientific back-
ground and training are sufficient to allow them to
comprehend and understand the process and form
6 Id. at -, 391 A.2d at 377.
'It is interesting to note such a reassessment in A.
MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, supra note 9, § 12.06, at 574 n.9:
[I]n the first edition of this book, written in 1972, it
was stated at p. 517, "It appears that at the current
stage of development most of the earlier critics of
the method are beginning to extend scientific ac-
ceptance to spectrographic voice identification." By
1978, the above statement definitely did not repre-
sent the attitude in the professional fields of speech,
audiology, phonetics, and acoustics-the fields
which study the voice by means of sound spectro-
graphs.
" See notes 13-23 & accompanying text supra.
65 A. MOENSSENS & F. INaAU, supra note 9, § 1.03, at
7-8.
' Comment, Voiceprints-The Admissibility Question:
What Evidentiary Standard Should Apply?, 19 ST. Louis U.L.J.
509, 528 (1975).
67 See note 61 & accompanying text supra.
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a judgment about it," 69 not merely those who are
practitioners and proponents of the technique.
Looking to the broader community of speech
scientists, the Reed court correctly assessed the lack
of general acceptance of spectrographic examina-
tion as a reliable technique for speaker identifica-
tion. Even after the Tosi study had increased un-
derstanding of spectrographic voice identification,
most scientists found the technique lacking an
adequate scientific basis for estimating reliability
in actual forensic situations.6 9
The Committee on Evaluation of Sound Spec-
trograms, appointed by the National Research
Council at the request of the Federal Bureau of
Investigaton, recently urged that, before spectro-
graphic voice identification can be deemed scien-
tifically reliable, more research must be conducted
to support the assumptions on which the technique
is based, to determine the effect of frequently en-
countered variables on the accuracy of identifica-
tion, and to quantify decisional criteria.70 Although
Reed v. State, 283 Md. at __, 391 A.2d at 368. The
relevant scientific community for these purposes includes
those knowledgeable in the fields of speech, audiology,
phonetics, and acoustics.
69 See Bolt, note 43 supra. See also People v. Collins, 94
Misc. 2d 704, 711, 405 N.Y.S.2d 365, 370 (App. Div.
1978), regarding a poll commissioned by the Technical
Committee on Speech of the Acoustical Society of Amer-
ica.7 0 See COMMirrEE ON EVALUATION OF SOUND SPECTRO-
GRAMS, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ON THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF VOICE IDENTIFICATION (1979).
the committee refused to decide whether the tech-
nique is acceptable for courtroom use, believing
that inquiry to be beyond the realm of science, 71 it
warned that "the technical uncertainties concern-
ing the present practice of voice identification are
so great as to require that forensic applications be
approached with great caution."' *2 The recent trend
in the state courts to apply the traditional Frye test
to spectrographic voice identification evidence
shows such caution. Perhaps future research will
establish the validity of spectrographic voice iden-
tification to the satisfaction of speech scientists. But
until that time, when the requirements of the Frye
test would be met, spectrographic voice identifica-
tion evidence should not be admitted at trial.73
71 Id. at 44. Although the Committee did not recom-
mend any particular standard of admissibility, it did cast
doubt on the McCormick approach by noting that,
"given the present uncertainty about the accuracy of
voicegram identification ... it is doubtful that adequate
standard instructions could be drafted." Id. at 47. Fur-
thermore, the Committee noted that, even if appropriate
instructions could-be developed, "a jury may be unable
or unwilling to understand and apply a complicated
cautionary instruction." Id. at 47-48.
72 Id. at 2.
73 The courts which have rejected spectrographic voice
identification evidence have emphasized that their hold-
ings are subject to reconsideration if the technique should
gain scientific acceptance. See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 17
Cal. 3d at 41, 549 P. 2d at 1251, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 155;
Reed v. State, 283 Md. at __, 391 A.2d at 377.
[Vol. 70
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CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS FOR INCOME TAX EVASION
Through the years, relatively little case law has
developed at the appellate levels establishing fine
lines of distinction in the standards to be imposed
in criminal prosecutions for income tax evasion. In
United States v. Garber,' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit added such a decision
to this area of the criminal law, imposing criminal
sanctions upon a taxpayer for her refusal to pay
tax on income derived from the sale of her blood.
However, by concluding that the challenged con-
duct warranted criminal sanctions, the Fifth Cir-
cuit failed to apply the standards which have been
developed in this area of the law.
1.
In Sansone v. United States,2 the Supreme Court
held that, in a prosecution for criminal tax evasion
pursuant to section 7201 of the Internal Revenue
Code,3 the government must prove "willfulness;
the existence of a tax deficiency.., and an affirm-
ative act constituting an evasion or attempted
evasion of the tax."4 The Court held that the
requisite element of "willfulness" was established
when the prosecution proved the taxpayer knew
that the challenged items were taxable in the years
under investigation.
5
The issue before the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in United States v.
Gritzer6 was whether the government could crimi-
1589 F.2d 843 (5th Cir. 1979).
2 380 U.S. 343 (1965).
3 I.R.C. § 7201 provides:
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner
to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or
the payment thereof shall, in addition to other
penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and,
upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more
than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years,
or both, together with the costs of prosecution.
4 380 U.S. at 351 (citations omitted).
5 Id. at 352. The "affirmative act constituting the
evasion of tax" is establishedwhere the taxpayer has filed
a false tax return. Id. at 351-52. It should be noted that
in a prosecution for criminal tax evasion, the government
must prove that a substantial amount of tax liability has
been evaded. It does not have to prove the exact amount
of the deficiency. See United States v. Miller, 545 F.2d
1204 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 930 (1977);
United States v. Allen, 522 F.2d 1229 (6th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976); United States v. Beasley,
519 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1975); Leeby v. United States, 192
F.2d 331 (8th Cir. 1951).
6 498 F.2d 1160 (4th Cir. 1974).
nally prosecute a person for willful tax evasion
when two governmental agencies disagreed on the
taxability of the challenged proceeds. The court
determined that the willfulness standard of section
7201 cannot be satisfied when the law governing
the taxability of the challenged items is "vague or
highly debatable.",
7
Amy Critzer, an Eastern Cherokee Indian, failed
to report income "derived from the operation of a
motel and restaurant, and from the lease of two
gift shops and some apartments."8 Premised upon
her intentional failure to report this income, the
government sought to prosecute Critzer for crimi-
nal tax evasion under section 7201. All of Critzer's
businesses were located on the lands of the Eastern
Cherokee Reservation in North Carolina, which
were held in trust by the United States for the
Eastern Cherokee Band pursuant to an act of
Congress.9 The act provided for "possessory hold-
ings" 10 in the Indians until conveyances of these
lands to individual Indians could be effected. No
conveyances had been made at the time of the
Fourth Circuit's decision in Critzer. The Depart-
ment of the Interior had determined that income
derived from businesses conducted on thes6 lands
during "possessory. holdings" was exempt from in-
come taxation,"1 thereby creating a conflict be-
tween the Department of Interior ind the other
governmental agency prosecuting Critzer for the
alleged violation of section 7201.12
Against this background of legal uncertainty
concerning the taxability of the proceeds received
by Critzer, the Fourth Circuit concluded: "As a
matter of law, the requisite intent to evade and
defeat income taxes is missing. The obligation to
pay is so problematical that defendant's actual
intent is irrelevant."' 3 The court based its decision
7 Id. at 1162.
8 Id. at 1160.
9An Act Providing for the final disposition of the
affairs of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians of North
Carolina, June 4, 1924, ch. 253, 43 Stat. 376.
'498 F.2d at 1161.
II Id. at 1162. The Department of the Interior did not
elaborate on the circumstances of this decision, it merely
stated that "for legal and policy reasons" it believed that
income from possessory holdings was tax exempt.
2 The Critzer opinion does not state which governmen-
tal agency was prosecuting Critzer for the alleged viola-
tion of § 7201.
13 498 F.2d at 1162.
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on the reasoning employed by the Supreme Court
in cases concerning the taxability of embezzled
funds and the embezzler's amenability to criminal
prosecution under section 7201.
In the 1946 decision of Commissioner v. Wilcox, 4
the Supreme Court held that embezzled funds were
not taxable income to the embezzler since he had
no claim of right to the embezzled funds and was
under a continuing obligation to return them.'5 Six
years later, however, the decision in Rutkin v. United
States16 gave rise to considerable doubts as to the
efficacy of Wilcox. In Rutkin, the proceeds received
by an extortionist were deemed taxable under a
theory that "readily realizable economic value"
was derived from them.' 7 In the wake of the Rutkin
decision, the lower courts made close distinctions
to avoid following Wilcox, confining the latter de-
cision to its facts.'8 In 1961, Wilcox was overruled
by James v. United States.i9 The James Court, adopt-
ing the logic of Rutkin, established the broad prin-
ciple that gains from illegal activities constitute
taxable income to the recipient.20 However, cogni-
zant of the confusion in the law governing the
taxability of embezzlement proceeds, the Court
reversed James' conviction under section 7201,
with the plurality concluding:
We believe that the element of willfulness could not
be proven in a criminal prosecution for failing to
include embezzled funds in gross income in the year
of misappropriation so long as the statute 1I.R.C.
§ 61(a)] contained the gloss placed upon it by Wilcox
at the time the alleged crime was committed.2'
Adopting these reasons, the Fourth Circuit in
Critzer concluded that the element of willfulness
required for a felony conviction under section 7201
was, as a matter of law, impossible to establish
when the law governing the taxability of the un-
14 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
'5 Id. at 408.
' 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
17 Id. at 137. The majority in Rulkin distinguished
Wilcox on its facts, stating that an extortionist derived his
income with the consent of his victim whereas an embez-
zler's victim does not give such consent. Id. at 138.
18 See, e.g., Macias v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 23 (7th
Cir. 1958); United States v. Wyss, 239 F.2d 658 (7th Cir.
1957); Briggs v. United States, 214 F.2d 699 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 864 (1954); Marienfeld v. United
States, 214 F.2d 632 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 865
(1954); Kann v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 247 (3d Cir.
1953).
'9 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
20 Id. at 219.
21 Id at 221-22.
derlying proceeds was unsettled. Furthermore, the
court held that, given these circumstances, "the
appropriate vehicle to decide ... pioneering inter-
pretations] of tax liability is the civil procedure of
administrative assessment ... not ... prosecution,
with attendant potential loss of freedom."2
II.
The United States Couri of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, in its recent decision in United States v.
Garber,' has implicitly indicated that it will not
follow the Fourth Circuit's decision to exempt from
criminal prosecution those cases involving "vague
or highly debatable" 24 laws goyerning the taxation
of income. This decision brings the Fifth and
Fourth Circuits into conflict and possibly violates
the Sansone andJames standards for a section 7201
felony tax evasion conviction.
A brief review of the facts of the Garber case is
required in order to appreciate the tax issues
therein involved. Dorothy Garber's blood plasma
had substantial commercial value due to the pres-
ence of a rare antibody, an Rh factor. Mrs. Garber
contracted with Biomedical Industries, Inc., in
1970 for the commercial exploitation of her blood.
Garber was to provide the blood plasma and
Biomedical was to convert this plasma into a mar-
ketable serum. Under the terms of the original
contract, Biomedical agreed to pay Garber $700
per "bleed"; in 1972, Biomedical agreed to pay up
to $1,600 per "bleed." In addition to these pay-
ments, Biomedical paid Garber a salary of $200
per week, provided her with a Lincoln Continental
automobile, paid her a sum in lieu of life insurance,
gave her 1,000 shares of Biomedical's common
stock for signing the 1970 agreement, and gave her
a $25,000 bonus for signing the 1972 agreement.
Garber failed to pay income tax on all funds-
except the $200 weekly salary-received from
Biomedical for the years 1970, 1971, and 1972. She
filed a joint return for those years reporting taxable
income of $7,593.34 for 1970, $13,603.60 for 1971,
and $9,512.80 for 1972. The government alleged
that her actual taxable income for those years was
$91,426.06 in 1970, $84,821.55 in 1971, and
$96,477.50 in 1972. After a jury trial, Garber was
convicted of income tax evasion in violation of
section 7201 and was sentenced to imprisonment
for eighteen months, "with 60 days to be served in
22 498 F.2d at 1164 (emphasis in original).
2 589 F.2d 843 (5th Cir. 1979).




a 'jail-type institution' and the remainder of the
sentence to be suspended."'
Relying on the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Critzer, Garber argued on appeal that, as a matter
of law, she could not have had the requisite "will-
fulness" for a violation of section 7201 since it was
uncertain whether income from the sale of her
blood was taxable because two governmental agen-
cies, the Internal Revenue Service and the Food
and Drug Administration, 2' disagreed as to
whether the sale of blood involved the disposition
of a product or the rendering of personal services.
27
The Fifth Circuit, however, attempted to distin-
guish Critzer from the facts of Garber, stating that
neither of the governmental agencies involved in
the latter had "advised her or otherwise led her to
believe ' '28 that the income from the sale of her
blood was not taxable and that those agencies had
not disagreed on the taxability of her income.
Therefore, the Garber court concluded that the
appellant's reliance on Critzer was misplaced, "for
regardless of whether blood is a personal service or
a product, the income derived from its sale would
constitute taxable income under section 61(a) of
the Code." 29
The grounds used by the Garber court to distin-
guish that case from Critzer are facile. Garber ar-
gued that since the issue of whether the sale of
25589 F.2d at 844 n.2. Garber was also "placed on
probation for a period of 21 months beginning immedi-
ately upon her discharge from incarceration," and or-
dered to pay a fine of $5,000 during the first year of
probation.
26 The Internal Revenue Service had determined that
the donation of blood involved a personal service, while
the Food and Drug Administration had ruled that the
sale of blood constituted the sale of a product. See text
accompanying notes 31 & 32 infra. See also text accom-
panying notes 39 & 40 infra for an explanation of the tax
consequences of these differing rulings.
27 See Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343. Garber
made two additional arguments on appeal, both of which
were rejected by the Fifth Circuit. First, Garber argued
that the funds received from Biomedical should have
been excluded from her taxable income under I.R.C.
§ 104(a)(2) as a recovery for personal damages. The court
concluded that, inasmuch as the payments to Garber
could not have been intended as a settlement of any tort
liability, they were outside of§ 104(a)(2)'s exclusion from
gross income. Garber also argued that the trial judge
erred in excluding her evidence on the law. The Fifth
Circuit affirmed the lower court's exclusion of this evi-
dence. 589 F.2d 843 (5th Cir. 1979).
2 589 F.2d at 848.
2 Id. I.R.C. § 6 1(a) in relevant part provides:
(a) GENERAL DEFINmoN-Except as otherwise pro-
vided in this subtitle, gross income means all income
from whatever source derived.
blood constituted the sale of a product or the sale
of a service was "highly debatable, '"ao she could
not, as a matter of law, have had the requisite
intent to violate section 7201. It is necessary to
address this argument on two levels to comprehend
how, as a matter of tax law, the differing charac-
terization of the sale of blood by two governmental
agencies could have affected the taxability of Gar-
ber's proceeds. It should have been determined,
first, whether a genuine uncertainty existed regard-
ing the characterization of the sale of blood and,
second, whether the classification of blood as a
product would have exempted Garber's proceeds
from taxable income.
The discrepancy between governmental agen-
cies' rulings concerning the classification of blood
resulted from the Food and Drug Administration's
regulations which treat blood as a product "even
while it remains in the donor," 1 and an Internal
Revenue Service ruling characterizing the dona-
tion of blood as a service for purposes of disallowing
certain charitable contributions.'s While it may
seem that with its 1953 revenue ruling the IRS had
concluded that, for tax. purposes, the sale of blood
involved personal services, this conclusion is more
apparent than real. The IRS based its ruling on
the characterization of the sale of blood upon two
1926 decisions rendered by the Comptroller Gen-
eral of the United States at the request of the
Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War.33
The IRS was not bound to adhere to the charac-
terization promulgated by the Comptroller Gen-
eral, it merely chose to follow his decisions for
purposes of the 1953 revenue ruling. Therefore,
with the interposition of the FDA's classification of
blood as a product a the tax characterization of
the sale of blood became genuinely "debatable."
w0 498 F.2d at 1162. See text accompanying notes 6-22
supra.
3' 589 F.2d at 848 n.7. See, e.g., 40 Fed. Reg. 53,532
(1975); 21 C.F.R. §§606, 640 (1977).
32 Rev. Rul. 162, 1953-2 C.B. 127-28. In this riling
the IRS disallowed a charitable deduction in the amount
of the fair market value of the blood donated because the
donation of blood had been characterized as a personal
service by another governmental agency.
3 5 Comp.. Gen. 658, 888 (1926). The Comptroller
General ruled that the sale of blood by enlisted personnel
to military hospitals involved personal services; addi-
tional compensation to the servicemen for this "service"
was denied.
' Although Garber referred the court to FDA regula-
tions promulgated subsequent to her acts allegedly in
violation of § 7201, blood had been classified, pursuant
to a federal statute, as a "biological product" prior to the
commission of her alleged offenses. This classification
19791
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In Crilzer, the Department of the Interior had
furnished the appellant with its opinion, stating
that it considered the income at issue to have been
exempted from taxes.35 However, the fact that the
Department of the Interior had supplied this advice
directly to Critzer was not crucial to the decision
in that case. The Critzer court based its decision on
the Supreme Court's ruling inJames,36 in which the
plurality ruled that actual reliance on, or advice
received directly from, an authority stating that
proceeds were not taxable was not required, as a
matter of law, to negate the specific intent required
for tax evasion.3 7 Therefore, whether a governmen-
tal agency had advised or otherwise led Garber to
believe that the proceeds from the sale of her blood
were not taxable was not relevant for the purposes
of distinguishing the facts of Garber from Critzer.
The Garber court also sought to distinguish Critzer
because neither of the agencies involved in Garber
had expressly stated that income derived from the
sale of blood was wholly excluded from taxable
income. The court therefore concluded that neither
agency had objected to the taxation of that income
under the broad aegis of section 61(a). However,
under the doctrine espoused by the Critzer court,
the fact that a governmental agency's statements
have not expressly focused on taxation does not
mean that the implicit tax consequences of those
statements can be ignored. For example, while it is
true that both the sale of a product and the sale of
a service can produce section 61 (a) taxable income,
the vendor of a product may recover his basis in
the product sold in the computation of his taxable
gain,39 whereas the vendor of personal services is
permitted to reduce his service income only by the
amount of his expenses incurred in the performance
of those services.'o These basic tax principles dem-
onstrate that, where the vendor's basis in the prod-
uct sold equals or exceeds his selling price, there is
no taxable gain, i.e., no taxable income, to the
vendor.
took place in the context of the federal laws promulgated
on public health and welfare. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)
(1976).
a' 498 F.2d at 1162.
36 See text accompanying notes 14-21 supra.
3- 366 U.S. at 321-22. A dissenting opinion in James
stated that a new trial should have been ordered in which
the trier of fact would consider any actual reliance on
Wilcox as a matter bearing on willfulness. Id. at 244
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
38 I.R.C. § 1012 provides, generally that the basis of
property is its cost to the taxpayer. See I.R.C. § 1016 for
allowable adjustments to the basis of property.
39 See I.R.C. § 1001 (a).
40 See I.R.C. § 162.
Given the uncertain state of the law governing
the classification of the sale of blood, the Fifth
Circuit's inquiry into the tax issue presented for
review should have reached the second level. The
court should have addressed whether Garber's pro-
ceeds would have been taxable if the FDA's clas-
sification of blood as a product was adopted. This
question focuses primarily on the basis Garber had
in the blood which she sold to Biomedical. If she
could have proved that her basis equaled or ex-
ceeded the selling price of her blood, then no
taxable gain would have resulted from the sale.
Such proof not only would have eviscerated the
Fifth Circuit's distinguishing of Critzer on the
grounds that "there is no disagreement between
governmental agencies concerning the taxability of
Garber's income,"'4 but also would have demon-
strated a fatal flaw in the government's case for tax
evasion under the Sansone standards, namely the
absence of a tax deficiency.
42
The problems involved with determining Gar-
ber's basis in the blood sold, including problems of
allocating and separating personal expenditures
from busineess -expenses,3 necessarily lead to the
conclusion that such a determination would be
"speculative." When the basis of the asset is
speculative, the recognition of gain depends upon
whether there is a final disposition of the asset.45
This final disposition test was first proposed by
the Fourth Circuit in Strother v. Commissioner.4 6 In
Strother, the taxpayer recovered damages from a
trespasser who had taken coal from the taxpayer's
mine and then destroyed his entries into the mine
so that the amount of coal taken could not be
4' 589 F.2d at 848.
42 380 U.S. at 351.
43For a general discussion of the tax problems that
may arise from the sale of blood and other human organs,
see Note, Tax Consequences of Transfers of Bodily Parts, 73
COLUM. L. REv. 842 (1973).
" Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d
110, 114 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944). In
Raytheon, the First Circuit considered the tax conse-
quences of damages recovered in a settlement of a private
antitrust action for the total destruction of Raytheon's
business goodwill. Raytheon's basis in the goodwill could
not be determined. The court held that the entire amount
received by Raytheon for the goodwill constituted tax-
able gain from the disposition of a capital asset. Reason-
ing that since the entire goodwill of the business had been
lost, the court ruled that "to require the taxpayer to
prove the cost of the good will is no more impractical
than if the business had been sold." Id.
4 Strother v. Commissioner, 55 F.2d 626 (4th Cir.),
aff'don other grounds, 287 U.S. 314 (1932). Accord, Raytheon
Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944).
46 55 F.2d at 626.
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determined. Since it was impossible at that point
to determine whether the recovery of damages
exceeded Strother's basis in the expropriated coal,
the court held the gain on the disposition entirely
conjectural and not taxable. "Any loss or gain in
the transaction could be determined under the
circumstances only upon a final dispostion of the
[minel.1 4
7
Garber's sale of blood may be analogized to the
facts of Strother. Garber had not made a final
disposition of the property, her body, and was
receiving proceeds from the sale of her blood at a
point when a determination of gain could have
been based only upon pure conjecture.48 Therefore,
47 Id at 632.
' An argument may be made that Strother permits the
deferral of the recognition of gain only when the asset
has a fixed, determinable, original cost basis that can be
compared with proceeds on the final disposition of the
asset in the computation of gain. This would mean that
where part of the asset is sold during the life of the asset,
and the allocation of basis to that partial disposition is
impossible, the gain recognized from that partial dispo-
sition is deferred until the final disposition of the asset.
However, the first circuit in Raytheon felt compelled to
analogize the disposition of goodwill in that case to a
final disposition, employing a different reading of Strother.
The court did not adopt the aforementioned argument
even though the goodwill involved had no determinable
if the Fifth Circuit had adopted the FDA's classi-
fication of blood as a product, under the logic
employed in Strother, Garber's income from the sale
of her blood would not have been taxable in the
years investigated by the IRS.
Although Garber may not have been able to
avoid the civil liability for income tax on the sale
of her blood in the years challenged, it should be
clear that she should not have been subjected to
criminal liability since there existed confusion in
the law governing the taxability of that income.
In refusing to look at the contradictory tax im-
plications implicitly contained in the statements of
the two governmental agencies, the Fifth Circuit
has allowed criminal prosecutions to become a part
of the process by which basic tax principles are
established. This divergence from the traditional
method of establishing these principles in civil
litigation may, unfortunately, set a new trend in
this area of the law. It is hoped that the other
circuits will not follow this trend and that either
the Fifth Circuit or the Supreme Court will over-
rule United States v. Garber.
cost basis and constituted a disposition of an asset by an
ongoing entity. Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner,
144 F.2d at 114.
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